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FIRS'.r DAY SECTION ONE 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia July 29, 1975 
1. Your client, Sam Driver, brings to you a motion for judg-
ment which was filed and served on him on July 17, 1975, the body 
of w~ich reads as follows: 
1. The piaintiff, Roscoe Fleetwood, has duly quali-
fied as administrator of the estate of Jim Wallace, de-
ceased, in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville, 
on the 8th day of July, 1975. 
2. Plaintiff moves the Court for a judgment against 
the defendant Sam Driver for the sum of $75,830 for the 
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by the said 
defendant in that said defendant did negligently operate a 
motor vehicle between Rugby Road and Vinegar Hill, in the 
City of Charlottesville, Virginia, causing said motor 
vehicle to strike and kill plaintiff's decedent who was 
crossing Rugby Road. 
Driver has fi~ed a demurrer to the motion for judgment. 
How should the Court rule on the demurrer? 
2. Jane Horseman commenced an action against Horse Van Carrier, 
the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Virginia, to recover dam-
s in the sum of $100,000 for serious personal injuries sustained 
plaintiff as a result of a collision between a car operated by her 
a horse van operated by the defendant. l~t the conclusion. of 
of the evidence and after receiving the instructions of the Court, 
sel for plaintiff and defendant argued the case. During the 
se of argument counsel for plaintiff said to the jury: "All Jane 
eman asks you gentlemen to do when you retire to your jury room 
o apply the Golden Rule - 'Do unto her as you wish that you would 
ne.'" Counsel for defendant promptly objected to that statement 
unsel for the plaintiff and, out of the hearing of the jury, 
the Court to declare a mistrial, or in lieu thereof instruct 
ury to disregard the argument as improper. The Court overruled 
tion· for a mistrial, holding that the argument was proper. The 
eturned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $65,000. 
Y thereafter counsel for defendant moved the trial court to set 
diet aside claiming that the Court erred in overruling de-
' s motion for a mistrial, or, in the alternative, in failing to 
.t the jury to disregard the argument as improper. The trial 
9verruled the motion and exception was noted. Defendant filed 
ion with the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of error and 





the Court in refusing to grant a mistrial, or, in lieu thereof, in 
failing to instruct the jury to disregard the argument as improper. 
Should the Supreme Court affirm the trial court 
or reverse that Court and remand the case for a 
new trial? 
3o William Houseman, a citizen of Tennessee, on May 7, 1975, 
sued John Gardener, a citizen of Virginia, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia, to obtain specific 
performance of an alleged contract for the sale of a farm, "Green 
Acres," which was owned by Gardener and was situate in Albemarle 
County, Virginia, and to recover damages in the sum of $25,000 for 
the alleged breach of the contract by Gardener. Gardener filed an 
answer in which he merely denied the averments contained in the com-
plaint, i.e., he denied that he entered into a contract with Houseman 
by which he agreed to sell the farm, "Green Acres," and he further 
denied that he was guilty of a breach of contract, as charged in the 
complaint, which would entitle Houseman to recover damages. No other 
pleadings were filed by the plaintiff or defendant. During the trial 
of the case Houseman proved: that on May 5, 1971, he and Gardener 
orally agreed that Gardener would sell to Houseman "Green Acres" for 
he sum of $150,000; that a deed for the farm would be delivered to 
ouseman by Gardener the 1st day of June, 1971, and that the purchase 
rice would be paid on the date of delivery of the deed; that Gardener 
efused to deliver a deed for the farm on June 1, 1971, as agreed, 
.'!:though Houseman then tendered payment of $150,000 to Gardener by 
~tified check; that on a number of occasions thereafter Houseman 
anded that Gardener deliver him a deed and accept payment of the 
chase price but Gardener refused in each instance; and that House-
had sustained a loss of $25,000 be0ause he had been denied pos-
sion of the farm and was unatlc to make a profit from the opera-
p thereof. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by Houseman, 
pener moved the Court for summary judgment on the grounds (a) that 
action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (b) that the 
ract was oral and therefore unenforceable because of the statute 
rauds. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of the 
motion? 
Jimmy Cc1r:ryaway was indicted in the Circuit Court of Prince 
9m County, Virginia, on a charge of breaking and entering with 
ntent to commit larceny. Promptly upon the return of the indict-
.~arryaway was arraigned on the indictment and entered a plea of 
ilty. He was tried on the indictment at the next regular 
f the Court, was found guilty and sentenced to five years in 







tiary, Carryaway, by his attorney, filed a petition in the Circuit 
court of Prince William County praying that a writ of habeas corpus 
be issued and that he be discharged from custody. In his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus Carryaway charged that during the trial 
on the indictment the Court erred in admitting, over his objection, 
the result of a lie detector test, and that the Court also, over his 
objection, admitted into evidence hearsay evidence that was material 
in establishing his guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. 
At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner proved that he had 
submitted to a lie detector test and that the result tended to prove 
his guilt. He also proved that the witness introduced by the Com-
monwealth was permitted to testify that he heard Joe Booze say that 
he saw the defendant open a closed window of the house that he was 
charged with entering and that he saw him enter the house and return :~ 
through the window with some valuable silverware. The petitioner 
also proved at that hearing that his attorney strongly objected to 
the admission of all of that evidence, and that the Court overruled 
,the objection. The Commonwealth offered no evidence at the hearing 
n the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. 
On a motion by the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
to strike the petitioner's evidence and to deny 
the writ of habeas corpus, hew should the Court 
rule? 
5. Herbert Nickels obtained a judgment for $5,000 against 
ert Payne in the Circuit Court of Mathews county, Virginia. Robert 
he and his brother John were tenants in common of sixty acres of 
erland in Mathews County which realty had a fair market value of 
1000. Shortly after his judgment was docketed, Nickels brought a 
in equity in the Circuit Court of Mathews County against Robert 
ohn Payne to partition the timberland. The bill recited the 
ent against Robert Payne, recited that Robert and John Payne were 
hts in common of the timberland, recited that rents and profits 
the timberland would not satisfy the lien of the judgment within 
years, prayed that the timberland be partitioned by sale, and 
er prayed that Nickels' judgment be satisfied out of that portion 
sale price allotted to Robert Payne. After the parties were at 
a stipulation was entered into and filed in the cause by 
s, Robert Payne and John Payne. By the stipulation, it was 
that Robert Payne had marketable personal property in Mathews 
worth $6,000. · John Payne thereupon filed a motion that the 
~ismiss Nickels 1 bill for partition asserting as the grounds 
r; (a) that Nickels was not entitled to relief by a partition 
timberland until he had exhausted his remedy to satisfy his 
~ out of the personal property of Robert Payne, and (b) that 
,could not properly proceed to satisfy his judgment by par-
of the timberland because John Payne was a co-owner of the 
realty and was not a debtor of Nickels. 
Should the Court sustain John Payne's motion on 
either, or both, of the grounds asserted? 
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6. Top-Service Taxi Corp. is engaged in business in the City 
of Richmond. Top-Service employs no drivers and owns no taxicabs, 
but receives orders for service from prospective passengers. It 
puts its sign "Top-Service Taxi Corp." on cabs which are owned and 
operated by independent drivers, each of whom pays Top-Service a 
mileage fee for each passenger Top-Service refers to the driver. 
After receiving a telephone call for cab service from Cecil Jones, 
Top-Service caused one of the independent drivers to pick him up. 
While transporting Jones, the driver carelessly collided with 
Walter Brown's automobile, damaging it and seriously injuring Jones. 
What liability, if any, does Top-Service have for: 
(a) the injuries to Jones; and 
(b) the damage to Brown's automobile. 
7. John Lacy is a resident of Knoxville. Tennessee, and is 
e owner of approximately 5,000 acres of land situated in the New 
ver Valley in the State of Virginia. In 1973 the General Assembly 
Virginia enacted a statute authorizing the State Engineer to 
nstruct a dam on New River at a point one mile downstream from 
land of Lacy, the completed dam to be of such height as to flood 
than one-half of Lacy's land. The construction of the dam has 
completed and Lacy 9 s land has been flooded. Although demanded 
acy, the Treasurer of the State of Virginia has refused to pay 
for resulting damage on the ground that the statute makes no 
ision for compensation to those adversely affected by the dam. 
has brought an action against the Treasurer and the State of 
inia in the United States District Court for the Western Distr.ict 
irginia. His complaint alleges the foregoing faats, and seeks 
es in the amount of $300,000. The Treasurer and the State of 
~ia have moved to dismiss Lacy's complaint on the ground that 
ils to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
How should the Court rule on the motion? 
Thomas Swan rented a safety box in the vault of First State 
the City of Fairfax. On December 27, 1974 Swan went to the 
deposit stock certificates in his safety box. After being 






found lying on the floor of the vault a negotiable bearer bond of 
the City of Richmond in the face amount of $5,000 payable on June 
30, 1981. Swan picked up the bond and, seeing it did not recite the 
name of the owner, left the vault and went directly to the office of 
the President of the Bank. There he told the President what had oc-
curred, and delivered the bond to the President only after being 
promised by the latter that, should the owner not call for the bond 
or become known by June 30, 1975, the Bank would redeliver the bond 
to Swan. On July 1, 1975, Swan learned that the owner of the bond 
had not called for it or become known to the Bank. Swan then asked 
that the bond be returned to him. The Bank refused to do so, saying 
it would continue to hold the bond until it learned the identity of 
the owner. Swan has now brought an action in detinue against the 
Bank in the Circuit Court of the City of Fairfax to recover possession 
of the bond. The President of the Bank consults you and, after re-
citing the foregoing facts, asks whether the Bank has the right to 
retain possession of the bond. 
What should your advice be? 
Delta Construction Company entered into a contract in July 
erect a building for Grove Department Store for $100,000 to 
when the building was completed. The contract contained a 
inding provision requiring that any disputes between the parties 
ould be submitted to arbitration. By May 15, 1975, Delta had com-
.lated fifty percent of the work on the building. At that time a 
'spute arose regarding subsurface conditions. Delta walked off the 
oject and refused to participate in arbitration. Shortly there-
· ter Third Party secured a judgment against Delta for $10,000. When 
lta failed to pay the judgment, Third Party sought to collect it 
om Grove through a garnishment proceeding on the theory that Delta 
~ld be entitled to collect considerably more from Grove than the 
0,000 Delta owed Third Party. 
Is Third Party entitled to collect $10,000 
from Grove in the garnishment proceeding? 
O. Paul alleged in his bill of complaint filed in the Circuit 
t of Warren County, Virginia, that he had entered into a "sup-
d marriage" with Winona upon her representation that she had 
lawfully divorced from her former husband, Joe; that following 
ceremony, and in the honest belief that they were lawfully mar-
., Paul purchased certain real property in Warren County and 
d it to be conveyed to him and his supposed wife as tenants by 
ntirety with the right of survivorship; that subsequently he 
d that Winona had not been lawfully divorced from her former 
d; and that although she had obtained a decree of divorce from 
rmer husband in the Circuit Court of Henry County, Virginia, 
ecree was void for want of jurisdiction because neither Winona 
r husband had been domiciled in, or a bona fide resident of, 
ate of Virginia for at least six months next preceding the 
Page Six 
commencement of the suit as required by the Virginia Code. Paul 
prayed that the "supposed marriage" be declared a nullity and that 
Winona be compelled to convey to him all of her interest in the 
real property. 
Winona filed a demurrer in which she asserted that Paul's 
suit against her was a collateral attack on the decree of divorce 
by the Circuit Court of Henry County and that Paul had no legal right 
to make such an attack since he was a stranger to the divorce pro-
ceedings. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and entered a decree 
dismissing the complaint. 
In an appeal by Paul, how should the Supreme Court 
of Virginia rule? 
FIRST DAY SECTION TWO 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia July 29, 1975 
1. Ben Skid of Reidsville, North Carolina, was driving his 
Oldsmobile cautiously in Henry County, Virginia, when a Dodge 
Charger rounded a curve at an excessive speed and crossed into 
Skid's lane. Although Skid slammed on his brakes, turned to his 
right and was pulling off the road, his car was clipped by Charycr, 
causing serious personal injuries to Skid. He was not able to as-
certain the indentity of the driver or owner of the Charger which 
continued down the road. Skid's automobile insurance policy had 
been issued in North Carolina and it contained an uninsured motor-
ist endorsement required by a North Carolina statute, which, con-
trary to the laws of Virginia, provided in part: 
"Where the insured, under the uninsured 
motorist coverage, claims that he has sus-
tained bodily injury as the result of colli-
sion between motor vehicles and asserts that 
the identity of the operator or owner of a 
vehicle (other than a vehicle in which the 
insured is a passenger) cannot be ascertained, 
the insured may institute an action directly 
against the insurer ••• " 
Skid hired a North Carolina attorney, who, not impressed 
Skid's appearance, checked into his background and found that 
Skid was Reidsville's foremost derelict with a reputation for never 
elling the truth. Skid 1 s attorney feels that in an action between 
n insurance company and Skid, Skid would elicit more sympathy, but 
hat Skid would never prevail in an action against John Doe. The 
orth Carolina attorney consults you and inquires as to whether 
id may in accordance with the North Carolina statute bring an 
tion directly against his insurance company in the Circuit Court 
Henr~ County. d t 3 ~r;. ,) 31 
H 
a (:_ f<-t Yi 'Jl?C'--<;1 be Df\. c 1.C \ t..J -ow ought you to advise him? u . p .... , 1,,. 
('{ c ~ f-'-".nLn, _'A( \ <.'.~Y ~'-'·'''' rU .. «•1 /~··. 
l;('. , 1,.l( \.') r( .. ,. 1l\.t,_, \{\ct._,,, lf.J (\t .• 0~ 
2 • World of Color Television Store agreed in writing on ~o f\!C 
e 20, 1975, to sell Consumer a particular television set "on h• ~nt\t' \ 
roval 11 with a provision that Consumer must decide within te~1 fr'.t \i(v. 
~ from that date whether to keep the set or not. Consumer 
ked up the set on June 20th, installed it in his home and began 
hing his favorite programs. Unbeknownst to World of Color, 
umer's creditors had been "hounding" him for some months. One 
'I' 
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of them had an execution issued on a judgment previously obtained 
and directed the Sheriff to levy on the television set. 
(a) Assuming World of Color took no steps to perfect a 
security interest in the set, would Consumer's creditor prevail 
under a levy made by the Sheriff within the ten-qay ~~;iod but 
prior to Consumer's dec~sion to acc.ep~ th,e s.et:? ~ -3,,.d-·(z} . .,, < ,.<:r.111. 
,:;h·.J/' Jv.icf C'Jt ,;.ij;rc-1Cl-•·{,,,_,f J·c·(:,;~·.f .4, <"-··l.....cc:.(t/<:L ,,,-le~ 1 
(b) Assume in the foregoing question that before the 
Sheriff had an opportunity to levy on the television set an un-
expected and unprecedented flash flood completely destroyed the 
set by flooding Consumer's basement recreation room during the ten-
day period but before Consumer had accepted the seto As between 
World of Color and Consumer, which party suffered the loss? . / <',/Cc u_,..__ ~ {j::.71- ;J.-:327(1) -'l~o h'ffc~,_~/)/ µtL<.'f" /<-~·i... 0\.. (v '' < 7 , 
3. Thomas Pate was the owner of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and of 
10 feet of Lot 7 adjoining Lot 6, in Section 24, of Grandview Farms, 
a fashionable subdivision of Salem. Pate desired to sell his prop-
erty. Upon learning that Ronald Jones was interested in purchasing 
this property, Pate went to see Jones, and they entered into an oral 
agreement for the sale of the property to Jones at the price of 
$26,000. 
Pate and Jones went to the off ice of Lawyer Trent where 
Pate instructed Trent to prepare a deed from him and his wife to 
Jones, conveying all of the above described real estate. Trent in-
advertently omitted to include the 10 feet of Lot 7 adjoining Lot 6 
4n the deed from Pate and his wife to Jones. This omission was not 
:aticed by either Pate or Jones at the time the deed was signed by 
ate and his wife and delivered to Jones, who then paid the full 
urchase price. 
Six months after the deed had been duly recorded and re-
rned to him, Jones noticed for the first time that the 10 feet of 
t 7 was not included in the deed, and immediately had Lawyer Trent 
epare another deed conveying the 10-feet wide strip and presented 
to Pate and his wife fcir execution. In the meantime real estate 
ues in Grandview Farms had increased dramatically, and Page, feel-
that he had sold the property too cheaply, refused to execute 
deed conveying the 10-feet wide strip of Lot 7, although he ad-
ted that it had been his intention to convey this strip along 
h the other lots. 
Jones now consults you, recites the foreqoing factG and 





4. On January 23, 1975, Jane Dickson, an elderly spinster, 
died in Abingdon, leaving as her heirs at law two sisters and a 
brother, William Dickson. The brother, William, and Miss Dickson 
had resided together in the latter's home for many years prior to 
the latter's death. Jane Dickson's will, which was entirely in 
her own handwriting, was admitted to probate in the Clerk's Office 
of the Circuit Court of Washington county, and reads as follows: 
"Abingdon, Virginia, June 22, 1968. 
"This is my last will and testament. 
"I appoint my brother, William Dickson, as Executor 
and Trustee of my estate. 
"To my brother, William Dickson, I present herewith 
and without recourse tho acc~mp~nying bonds, stocks, 
mortgage notes, real estate, bank accounts and valuables 
of all description in my safe deposit box at Second Na-
tional Bank of Abingdon, or at any other place where, 
same may be found at the time of my death. 
"My brother knows my wishes and will carry them 
out to the best of his ability. 
Signed - Jane Dickson" 
Thereafter, William Dickson qualified as Executor of Jane 
Dickson's will. When Jane's surviving sisters learned thnt William 
was claiming the entire estate, they instituted a suit in chancery 
against William in the Circuit Court of Washington County, asserting 
that under the terms of Jane Dickson's will, she intended to create 
a trust for undesignated beneficiaries and unspecified purposes 
which must fail for indefiniteness and, therefore, her estate should 
be held by William as Trustee under a resulting trust for the bene-
fit of her heirs at law. William filed his answer to the bill of 
ornplaint, asserting that he was entitled to the entire estate to 
he exclusion of Jane Dickson's other heirs. Lu~ ·sJ~ ..<lihctt... :$ .,~11/10~-
Whct construction should the Court give to 
Jane Dickson's will? 
5. John Brooks, a resident of Carroll County, died testate 
May 3, 1955, survived by his wife, Mary, but without issue. His 
11 was duly probated in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of 
rroll County on May 12, 1955. Clause Three of his will provides: 
"I give and devise unto my wife, Mary, my farm 
known as 'Pleasant Hills' for and during her 
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life, and after the decease of my wife, Mary, 
I give and devise in fee simple the tract or 
parcel of land above described and known as 
'Pleasant Hills' to the youngest son of my 
sister, Susan Brown." 
At the time of the death of John Brooks, James Brown was 
the youngest son of the testator's sister, Susan Brown, but James 
Brown died intestate in 1969 leaving as his heirs his wife, Nancy 
Brown, and two children, John Brooks Brown and Sarah Brown. Mary 
Brooks died on May 3, 1975, at which time George Brown was the 
youngest living son of the testator's sister, Susan Brown. 
George Brown instituted a suit in the Circuit Court of 
Carroll County against the widow and heirs at law of James Brown, 
asking the aid of the Court in construing the will of John Brooks 
and asserting that since his younger brother, James Brown, had died 
prior to the death of the life tenant, Mary, his interest in 
"Pleasant Hills" was divested at his death and that he, George Brown, 
became vested with the property upon the death of the testator's .-"1 
wife, Mary Brooks. ,,, \ \ 
I) \ ) 
What should be the Court's construction of Clause r 
Three of the John Brooks will? 
6. Barrister had unsuccessfully defended Prisoner on an in-
dictment charging the latter with murder in the Circuit Court of 
Russell County in 1974. 
Prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the Circuit Court of Russell County in February, 1975, alleging his 
constitutional rights had been violated in that he had not had the 
benefit of competent counsel. In support of this allegation, 
Prisoner's petition specifically asserted that he had told Bar-
rister that one of the jurors on the panel was prejudiced against 
him by reason of various disagreements, lawsuits and fights; and 
that Barrister had refused to question the named juror concerning 
such incidents or to even eliminate such juror by preemptory strike. 
As a matter of fact, when the list of prospective jurors 
~as being reviewed with him, Prisoner had advised Barrister that 
his particular juror was a frimrl of: his e.nd insisted that he be left 
n the panel. 
Shortly after the filing of Prisoner's petition for writ 
habeas corpus, the Commonwealth's Attorney of Russell County 
Ubpoenaed Barrister to testify at the hearing on the petition. While 
n the stand, the Commonwealth's Atoorney asked Barrister to reveal 
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the communications which Prisoner had made to him relative to the 
juror referred to in the petition. Prisoner objected tp the ques-
tion. t/-/0/ /awy-ec.Jit.'J. &;'f~d-'-"''<· » .lf-'e·(/'f- ,rd ·/t ~:._:·J.~~~:t«. 1 : .•• 
What should be the Court's ruling on Prisone;' s /:",'';.~uf t:fJtz~, 
objection? (,•/[//':}~/~/((, 
7. T executed a subscription of 100 shares of the stock of 
nf ·N Corporation at $50 par value per share. He paid $1,000 at the 
' time of the subscription and the balance was deferred by agreement 
to the call of the Board of Directors. N Corporation became insol-
vent and John Doe, one of its creditors, filed suit against T demand-
ing that he pay a judgment in the amount of $3,000 which Doe had ob-
tained against the N Corporation. T defended, alleging no privity 
of contract with Doe and no obligation to pay such a, sum. [:i:~; 
-;~ v~ l~1tLA• t_:, ~ £.c.c c- '.-- ./<,, ...... .! 1 
Are his defenses valid? {l "-/1..l j Jcchs\.i, t> 1:·1' 01 </~t.'.'<·/" t 
cj 1 /;;;t / 0 rjJ { .fki!tf, 
8. Torn Timid purchased a new car from Dan Dealer in the 
course of which he signed a promissory note for the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price. The note was attached to a sales contract 
and was to cover the balance of the purchase price, license fees 
and certain additional equipment specified by Timid. As the price 
of certain extra equipment was not available locally, Timid signed 
the note with the amount to filled in by Dealer, who assured him 
that the total amount of the note would not exceed $3,700. After 
all prices were obtained, Dealer completed the note and sent Timid 
a copy. He explained that the total indebtedness shown on the note, 
$3,975, was more than contemplated because equipment prices had 
risen. ~ f ,,27c-c 
Timid consul ts you as to whether he must pay (rvv~ r , ;;/Z.1.Pt - , 
the note. •-i Jl v..-lH'- '' f .- l! 
I-L Cl (. u,{< t l i c i/. l ' ''-l(D) ,) .,. .J 
9. The City of Richmond decided that, instead of buildin~ a 
ew junior high school, it would completely remodel an existing 
tructure. In connection therewith it issued invitations for bids · 
pr a central heating and air conditioning unit powered by solar 
ergy. The specifications were closely tailored to a unit manu-
ctured and distributed by SunAir, Inc. which had been in success-
1 operation in school buildings in the southwest part of the 
untry for about five years. The bidding documents required the 
ader to furnish, install and for a period of 20 years to maintain 
~ equipment. The specifications contained the following provision: 
"The City may roject any and all proposals, waive 
any informalities or irregularities in the pro-
posals received and may accept that proposal which 
in its judgment best serves the interest of the City." 
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The City received three bids in response to the invita-
tion: One from SunAir, Inc. citing an installation and delivery 
cost of $83,640 with delivery scheduled in six months; one from 
Eastinghouse, Inc. with delivery and installation costs of $81,500 
and delivery in one year; and one from TempMaster, Inc. with de-
livery and installation costs of $62,300 and a delivery scheduled 
in 15 months. In addition, each bid outlined the services it pro-
posed to furnish in maintaining the equipment and each bidder pro-
vided a similar guarantee. The City of Richmond employed an engi-
neer to evaluate the bids, after which he recommended that the City 
accept the bid submitted by SunAir, Inc. as being in the overall 
best interest of the City, bearing in mind the reliability of the 
equipment, the time of delivery, and the cost and.reliability of 
the proposed maintenance as required in the bid documents. 
TempMaster, which was a new company with an innovative ap-
proach to temperature controls and the use of solar energy, but 
which had no equipment actually operating in any building similar 
i~~o a junior high school, filed a petition in the Circuit Court of 
v the City of Richmond praying that a writ of mandamus be issued com-
J pelling the City Manager to award the contract to TempMaster as 
. Lthe lowest bidder and ordering the City Manager not to execute a 
~"' contract with SunAir. 
How should the Court rule on the petition? 
10. The United States purchased a tract of land in Nottaway 
County adjoining Camp Pickett. Subsequently, it leased the property 
for a term of 40 years to Pickett Gardens, Inc., a private corpora-
tion, which agreed to construct thereon and to operate a housing 
project for the military. The lease provided that upon its termina-
tion the United States would be entitled to possession of the entire 
project with all improvenents. 
Upon completion of construction of the housing project, 
Nottaway County assessed the lessee with real estate taxes on the 
buildings. Lessee paid the taxes under protest and instituted pro-
ceedings to recover the payment in the Circuit Court of Nottaway 
pounty on the basis that the project was immune from taxation. 
Should the lessee prevail? 
'• I 
